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1 In Colombia, as in most of the Western world, a policy for leprosy arose which was guided
by the aim of preventing society from being infected by a disease whose causes and
adequate treatment were unknown in the field of medicine for a long time. Although the
way  in  which  society  confronted  this  “disaster”  varied  over  the  centuries,  a  close
relationship between the political regime, advances in the field of medicine which threw
light on its causes and treatments and the financial-monetary policies of the country was
evident. 
2 In the case of  Colombia,  the fight  against  leprosy began during the Spanish colonial
regime, a time when the first leper colonies were also founded. In the Republican period,
especially during the Liberal governments of the mid-19th century, the State showed a
stronger commitment to the problem by supporting leper colonies for the persons with
the disease who could not afford to look after themselves. At the end of that century,
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under  Conservative  governments,  the  obligatory  confinement  of  the  diseased  was
decreed and barely at the start of the 20th century a special currency was created for the
leper colonies. 
3 With the start of a new Liberal regime in the 1930´s, there was a more flexible approach
to the policy of confinement and the State decreed that the national currency should
circulate in the leper colonies. In practice, however, the special currency of the colonies
continued to be exclusively used within the colonies until they were closed in 1961.
4 The period chosen for this article combines two factors: the obligatory confinement of
those with leprosy in the leper colonies and the introduction of a special currency for
those places. These criteria define the period under study, which runs from 1890, when
the law which established the obligatory isolation in Colombia of those with leprosy was
passed,  to 1930,  the start  of  a change in public health policies which gave a greater
flexibility to the confinement of those affected by the disease. In this period, there were
three emissions of a special currency for the leper colonies in the country. 
5 The convergence of these two occurrences:  obligatory isolation and the issuance of a
special currency for leper colonies was responsible for a case that might be considered as
an “exceptional normal” 1 one in the Colombian systems of social protection, insofar as
we can find no other experience like it, but through it one may understand historical
processes that were normal in the history of the country. 
6 The exceptional normal nature of that situation turns out to be a suitable opportunity for
reflecting  on  the  idea  of  currency,  understood  as  a  social  totality,  since  from  that
standpoint,  one  can  analyze  the  links  between  two  fields  of  research  which  have
traditionally been separated: currency and social protection.
7 The case under study shows some features which allow us to enrich the discussion of
some theoretical-methodological  proposals,  like those which regard systems of  social
protection  as  mechanisms  of  social  mediation  and  those  which  deal  with  monetary
sovereignty  (Théret  2006  and  2013).  The  emphasis  in  the  discussion  is  on  two
components:  the  idea  of  the  State  as  an  institution  and  the  relations  between  the
political, economic and domestic orders in the shaping of the system of social protection.
8 The sections which follow are arranged in the following way: the first discusses the way
in which the obligatory confinement of diseased persons was established. The second
discusses the relation between the special currency in leper colonies and the fiscal and
monetary situation. The third deals with the special currency in leper colonies and the
“monetary ration” for the living expenses of  the interns.  The final  one presents our
conclusions. 
 
1. Exclusion and social disaffiliation. Obligatory
confinement
9 As was mentioned in the previous paragraphs, when you look at the way the Colombian
State set its policy for those who suffered from leprosy, it is possible to find a strong
relationship  between the  political  regime,  medical  knowledge  and  financial-currency
rules in the Colombian experience. We need to point out that the definition of these
policies  incorporated  long-lasting  features  insofar  as  there  existed  a  culture  of  fear
related to an illness which might infect a considerable percentage of the population and
the way in which pre-capitalist societies conceived of poverty2. As follows, we discuss the
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manner  in  which  that  policy  and  medical  knowledge  were  integrated  to  create  and
consolidate the obligatory confinement of the diseased.
10 When  the  colonial  period  ended,  and  closely  following  the  principles  of  political
liberalism in the territory of present-day Colombia, a democratic State with a separation
of  powers  was established,  adjusted to  a  system of  laws,  but  with a  citizenship of  a
patrimonial character.3 One of the challenges the Colombian State faced when imposing a
new currency regime – which, in contrast with the one in force in the United States,
which fixed the dollar as the new unit of account (Le Maux y Scialom 2013) – was to
maintain the monetary rules implanted by the Spanish Crown, which was meant to give
legitimacy to the new, independent country of Colombia (Rodríguez S. 2011a). Measures
like the adoption of free trade, the abolition of slavery, the separation of the Church and
State, federalism as a form of political organization, the disentailment of mortmain, the
adoption of the gold standard and free banking were the programmatic axes of what was
known as liberal radicalism (Rodríguez S. 2016).
11 Furthermore,  liberalism  introduced  an  analysis  of  responsibility  – in  the  sense  that
Bourdieu uses  it –  about  social  problems:  poverty  was  regarded more  as  the  lack  of
dynamism in market forces4 than a matter of fate. What was known as the first Liberal
Republic (1850-1886) issued a Charitable Code (Manuel Murillo Toro 1869),  which was
intended to “benefit, protect and assist poor or needy persons, without cost and without
distinction”. These roles, which were assigned to the Public Establishments of Charity and
Beneficence, were the responsibility of the Federal States and the Municipal Corporations
(Rodríguez S. 2006, p. 232). 
12 Within  this  political  framework,  a  system  of  social  protection  was  designed,  which
organized the two most important leper colonies: in the town of Contratación (1861) and
the town of Agua de Dios (1871). There was a third leper colony, Caño de Loro, founded in
1796, which had a small number of patients and was poorly financed, which was normal
for the leper colonies a whole. During this early stage, those who had the disease were not
forced to isolate themselves in these institutions and those who did could have access to
the meager resources which the State devoted to dealing with the illness. 
13 The path towards obligatory confinement began during the period of the Regeneration5
(1886-1903) and advanced during the government of General Rafael Reyes (1904-1909),
who at the beginning of 1905 closed the Congress and summoned a Legislative Assembly
with which he governed until the end of his term. During those 23 years measures were
adopted  which  restricted  both  democratic  freedoms  and  the  exercise  of  political
opposition,  and the political  agreements created in the Liberal  period were radically
changed. 
14 This regime would be characterized by: political centralization, a State monopoly of the
management of monetary supply, the centralization of revenues, the stabilization of the
relation between Church and State, with its correlative of the ecclesiastical control of
education, and the defense of national labor through a substantial increase in tariff levels
which did not alter the terms of trade but did bring gains in the form of the political
support of the artisan class.6
15 The  Social  Protection  System  implemented  during  this  period  was  governed  by  the
Church and the State. In 1886, as part of the process of political centralization, a Central
Hygiene Board was organized which supervised the departmental boards, some of which
were responsible for public health measures and also for anti-leprosy campaigns. 
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16 Four years later, the government came up with a set of measures aimed at strengthening
the fight against leprosy, among which there stood out Laws 104 and 113 of 1890. The first
decreed the obligatory isolation of those with leprosy in leper colonies (except for those
who could afford to isolate themselves in their own homes) and the second created a tax
on mortuaries and between living people gifts which was specifically destined to finance
the leper colonies (the leper colonies tax). 
17 In 1896, article 1 of Law 55 reiterated the need “to gather together and isolate all those
who have leprosy who exist  in the Republic”.  With Law 28 of  1903,  the government
ordered the departments to create a leper colony in the territory under their jurisdiction
and collect and isolate in it all those with leprosy who were living in their department. 
18 Finally, under legislative decree 14 of 1905, justified by the figure of a State of Emergency,
the executive declared that the “isolation and sequestration of the individuals who suffer
from the disease known by the name of leprosy, established by a medical examination, is
a measure of urgent necessity” and stipulated that it was obligatory for every person,
including their doctors and relatives, to inform the authorities of any person with leprosy
they knew of. 
19 In addition to the conservative character of the regime, another factor which played a
role in the adoption of the obligatory confinement of the diseased was the influence of
the international scientific community, for example, through the dissemination of the
conclusions of the first International Congress on Leprosy, held in Berlin in 1897, which
gave legitimacy to such isolation (Pandya 2003). As Abel Martínez notes, in this context in
Colombia “the only thing the doctors agreed on was that to prevent people from being
infected the isolation of the diseased had to be imposed. In addition, they thought that
illness was caused by poverty and the civil wars the country had experienced helped to
spread it” (Martínez 2006, p. 19). 
20 By  the  same  token,  the  religious  orders  who  ran  the  leper  colonies  (the  Salesian
Community, the Congregation of the Daughters of Mary and the Dominican Sisters of
Charity of the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin) sought to gain social,  political  and
cultural  legitimacy by overestimating the number of the diseased.  Among those who
promoted the idea that “Colombia was the world leader in leprosy” (Martínez 2006) was
the Salesian Father Evasio Rabagliati, who arrived in Colombia in 1890 and later held the
posts of “Visitor to the leper colonies” and “Chaplain of the country´s leper colonies”, and
was known in his day as the Apostle of the Lepers (Ortega 1938). In a talk given on August
2, 1896, this priest “spoke of the increase in the number of those with the disease from
27,600 to 40,000 and even 50,000 in a single year” (Cuellar 2014, p. 23)7. In the face of such
a calculation of the number of the diseased, their obligatory confinement was shown to
be unavoidable.
21 For his part, General Reyes stated that “there are 27,250 people with elephantiasis in
Colombia, more than in the rest of America and Europe”. With the aim of fighting that
scourge,  he called on a group of citizens to form a board, in association with Father
Rabagliati, and “with the resolute and enthusiastic collaboration of the clergy and the
country´s charitable organizations”, collect funds for the founding of a National Leper
Colony (Martínez 2006, p. 66).
22 These inflated figures enabled Rabagliati to go ahead with his original proposal to create
“Lepers  Banks”  in  the major  cities,  with the aim of  organizing departmental  lepers´
colonies. The funds from public charities would be converted into shares in the bank8. In
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Bogotá,  the bank founded in 1901 amassed a  capital  of  $150,000 pesos in only three
months. Two years later, a similar one was created in the city of Tunja9, which had an
initial capital of $31,045 gold pesos, the equivalent of 6,209 shares worth $5 pesos each.
Two years after that, that organization became the Banco de Boyacá and its philanthropic
aims were forgotten (Martínez 2006, p. 93). 
23 By  exaggerating  the  number  of  the  diseased,  both  the  medical  community  and  the
Salesian Order led General Reyes to regard leprosy “as the most important problem the
country  had,  more  than  paper  money,  railways  and  public  education”  and  only
comparable with peace. In 1904 Reyes sent an urgent circular to the Congress with the
aim of “eradicating leprosy” by isolating the patients, in which he agreed with Doctor
Sauton´s over-estimate of the number of lepers in the country (Martínez 2006, p. 183). 
24 This inflation of the problem had repercussions in foreign markets.  The press in the
United States published articles about the disaster Colombia was suffering and the effects
were  seen  in  the  restrictions  which  were  imposed  on  Colombian  exports,  especially
coffee.
25 With that diagnosis, the government decided it was imperative to adopt administrative
measures  aimed at  controlling the disease.  It  established the Central  Office  of  Leper
Colonies, under the Ministry of Government, which was charged with the direction and
administration of the colonies in Colombia, formerly run by charitable boards, religious
orders and public charities.
26 In the case of the most important leper colony at the beginning of the 20th century,
located in the town of Agua de Dios, the government of the Department of Cundinamarca
(where it  was  situated),  issued  Departmental  Decree  159  of  1907,  which  divided  the
administration of the leper colony into an external and internal part (Art. 1). The policing
measures  laid  down in  article  41  gave  the  inspector  of  police  the  responsibility  for:
supervising  on  his  part  and  those  of  his  subalterns  the  enclosures  of  isolation  and
reporting the damages seen in them to the Administrator; and preventing any act which
tends to destroy the enclosures of isolation or render them ineffective”. 
27 Article 55, which dealt with disinfection, prescribed that “in the office of the marketplace
there will be a place responsible for disinfecting the official and private correspondence
which leaves the leper colony”. Article 58 stipulated that “all of the healthy persons who
reside in the leper colony, regardless of the position they hold, must supply themselves
with disinfected clothing when they need to leave it”10.
28 The Social Protection System developed during the Conservative Republic was based on
the use of charity and hygiene as a device of social control (Noguera 1998). It adopted the
standpoint of Christian charity and can be characterized as what Bruno Lautier (1999)
calls “repressive” aid. The social protection applied in the leper colonies did not achieve
much, according the report the Central Board of Hygiene11 submitted to the Congress in
August, 1915, which stated that: 
[…] the foundation of the Lepers Colonies has a twin aim: the protection of the
diseased, lightening the burden of their enormous affliction, and social defense, to
prevent  the  spreading of  this  terrible  disease  by  all  means  recommended  by
science.  Despite  the  goodwill  of  the  government  and the  large  expenditure  the
country makes on supporting the lepers colonies, the victims of the disease are not
well cared for nor is society effectively protected (Board of Hygiene 1915, p. 71).
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2. The special currency for the leper colonies and the
fiscal-monetary problems
29 In addition to its aim of controlling the population, the emission of currency is a response
to  the  financial  problems  which  different  governments  confront.  Three  economic
phenomena were behind the creation of the special currency: the process of stabilizing
the currency, the financial problems the government faced and the funding of the leper
colonies. 
30 At the end of the 19th century, the armed conflict known as the “War of a Thousand
Days”  (1899-1902)  broke  out,  caused  by  the  exclusion  of  the  Liberal  party  and
strengthened by criticisms of the financial and monetary policies of the Conservative
government.  In  monetary  matters,  despite  their  promise  to  return  to  the  metallic
standard,  the  final  governments  of  the  Regeneration  (1886-1903)  maintained  the
circulation of paper money with the force of legal tender, and that currency suffered a
considerable discount as it circulated.
31 The monetary  and fiscal  situation  during  the  war  made  it  evident  that  it  would  be
impossible for the government to fulfill its promises about the currency, and that, on the
contrary, the amount of assets in money which were in circulation had increased, since,
to finance the war, the government resorted to any monetary resource that was available:
bank notes of the Banco Nacional, unnumbered bank notes in the liquidating office of the
Banco  Nacional,  bank  notes  issued  by  private  banks  that  were  resealed  by  the
government, lithographic bank notes, and vouchers (in some cases in the form of stamps)
to pay the wages both of its troops and civilian employees. 
32 In addition, large commercial concerns issued their own private coins, the departmental
governments  were  authorized  to  issue  bank  notes  of  their  own  and  finally,  high
denomination bank notes were issued, against the promise that the government would
pay interest on them when they were redeemed (Arévalo 2016).
33 It was in that context that the government decided to create a special currency for the
leper colonies that would exclusively circulate in those places of confinement and serve,
as a matter of obligation, as a legal tender there. In the words of decree 129 of 1900, “it
was an urgent matter of policing and hygiene that the dangers implied by the circulation
of national bank notes in the leper colonies be eliminated whenever possible”, dangers
which could be reduced with the circulation of the metallic currency. To implement that
stipulation, the government issued decree 300 of 1901, which defined the characteristic of
the special currency for the leper colonies: 
• Denominations: 50, 20, 10, 5 and 2½ centavos; 
• Metal: alloy of aluminum and copper15; 
• Size: equivalent to those of the silver coins with a 0.835 silver content 
• which circulated on a national level, with their respective denominations; 
• Design: on one side there is a Maltese cross with the word leper colony in the center and the
value is written in letters around it. The other side specifies the value in numbers and the
legend “Republic of Colombia” is written around it.
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Source:http://media.liveauctiongroup.net/i/11661/12160176_1.jpg?v=8CECC6A244EEAD0
34 These characteristics of the special coins for the leper colonies show the intention to
maintain a direct reference to the national currency insofar as they maintained the same
sizes  and  denominations,  but  expressed  a  symbolic  message  of  stigmatization.
Furthermore, this emission showed that in the thinking of the legislator there was the
idea of a limited need for exchange, since the volume of the transactions that could be
made with those denominations was restricted. 
35 When the War of a Thousand Days ended, a process of monetary reorganization began
that turned out to be rather slow12. Two of the main problems with monetary affairs the
country faced were, on the one hand, a shortage of minerals to mint coins with and a
return to the gold standard, as the reforms of 1903, 1905 and 1907 promised, and, on the
other, the absence of a bank of issue. 
36 The monetary system which resulted from those reforms was the bimetallic standard of
gold and silver in a fixed ratio of 1/33 (each gram of gold at 0.900 corresponded to 33
grams of silver with the same content) but with limits on both the amount of silver coins
(their mintage could not surpass 10 % of the mintage of gold coins) and the purchasing
power of silver coins (no more than 10 pesos in any transaction). Similar rules applied to
the fractional coins in nickel and copper17. For a long time by then and despite promises
to return to metallic currency, paper currency continued to circulate (both those issued
by the now defunct Banco Nacional and the currency emitted to finance the war). 
37 Even after  agencies  were created which were supposed to collect  the banknotes and
reconvert them into metallic currency, not enough metal was available nor were there
adequate financial resources to administer the change. The monetary problems of the
country were aggravated, in the first place, by the absence of a bank of emission13 or
central  bank,  and  in  the  second  place,  by  the  constitutional  reform  of  1910  which
prohibited the emission of paper money as legal tender. 
38 In the midst  of  the abovementioned reforms,  and in line with Law 8 of  1905 of  the
Constitutional  Assembly  and  a  strengthening  of  the  policy  of  confinement,  the
government ordered the minting of a new series of special coinage for the leper colonies
(formalized by decree 1452 of 1907, when the perimeters of the leper colony at Agua de
Dios had been fully enclosed in barbed wire), which corresponded to 30,000 gold pesos in
nickel coins of 1, 5 and 10 centavos. This feature of the coinage was the reason why the
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special coins for the leper colonies became known as coscoja, meaning “a little thing”, that
is, coins of little value. 
39 In  1915,  arguing  that  the  amount  of  currency  issued  for  the  leper  colonies  was
insufficient, the government decided to increase its minting of copper-nickel coins at a
total amount equivalent to $21,026.70 gold pesos. The peculiarity of this emission is that
it corresponded to a monetary reform of that currency, since the face values of the coins
were modified to take inflation into account.
40 In the former emissions, the coin with the highest value was the gold 10 centavos one and
now denominations of 50, 20, 10, 5 and 2½ centavos were minted. They were meant to
replace all of the coins minted in 1901 (which, in fact, was the date on the new coins). As
in previous decrees, the circulation of the special currency beyond the limits of the leper
colonies was prohibited and the penalty was the seizure of the money. This strategy of
monetary  reconversion  also  served  as  a  form  of  financing  the  spending  on  that
institution. However, given the difficult fiscal conditions of the country, the emission was
not undertaken.
41 Decree 2209 of 1918 once again called attention to the need to remit money to the leper
colonies and in this case, referred not only to the shortage of the special currency but
directly mentioned the financial needs in question, since this currency was meant to pay
for the monetary rations of the patients. But, given the abovementioned fiscal crisis and
the measures adopted since 1915 to transfer the funds in the possession of the Conversion
Board (meant for the exchange of paper money) to the “common funds” of the General
Treasury, there was no way to finance the new mintage. 
42 The authorization to mint new coins in 1918 came into play three years later when the
country faced a new economic crisis and the government a new fiscal one. Decree 738 of
1921  ordered the  minting  of  $100,000 pesos  in  denominations  of  50,  20,  10,  5  and 1
centavos. The implementation of the reform thus authorized was meant to be gradual,
depending on the resources available to the Conversion Board, insofar as the Conversion
Board would mint the new coins in stages and step by step, send them to the General
Treasury so that it could pay the rations with them. The coins were also meant to replace
the nickel and copper coins which were in circulation. The last minting of the coscoja took
place in 1928, but it was only in the form of bronze coins of $0.50 pesos. 
43 There were major difficulties on the fiscal front. In addition to the debt the State had
incurred in to finance the War of a Thousand Days, revenues from customs duties had
significantly fallen, triggered, in turn, by the fall in the price of coffee, the main export
product. The slow economic recovery which started to take place in 1910 was then halted
by the negative effects of the First World War and forced the country into a severe fiscal
crisis.  As we have said, the fall  in fiscal revenues could not be made up for with the
emission of more currency.
44 As the Treasury Minister, Esteban Jaramillo, pointed out in his report to the Congress in
1918, from the end of 1917 there had been an uninterrupted fall in State revenues which
increased the fiscal deficit, which by the end of July 1918 had risen to nearly 40 % of the
budget for that year (Jaramillo 1988a, p. 59).  According to that Minister, the financial
problem  was  caused  by  a  fall  in  customs  revenues  (which  was  the  main  source  of
government income), due to the closing of imports by the War. 
45 In his opinion, so long as the conflict was restricted to the countries of Europe, the level
of Colombian imports was maintained, but when the United States, Colombia´s main trade
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partner, joined in the war, the fall in imports dealt a harsh blow to customs revenues
(Jaramillo 1988a, p. 59). Given that situation, the government dismissed the possibility
that  an  increase  in  taxes  would  bring  about  higher  government  revenues,  since,  in
addition to the expected opposition to such a measure, the tax would fall on consumer
products and thus might reduce consumption or stimulate the trade in contraband goods
(Jaramillo 1998b, p. 235)14.
46 To this temporary situation there was added a longer-term problem: the State´s weak
capacity to emit currency, which thwarted the possibility of using currency as a fiscal
resource. In the first place, the country did not have a bank of emission15 and in the
second, the constitutional reform of 1910 prohibited emissions of legal tender and the
government did not have the resources to back the emission of paper money with metal,
nor a sufficient capacity to coin metal ones. 
47 Since it was impossible to raise taxes or use emission as a source of State funding, there
was a dependence on credit whenever there was a crisis. Of course, the situation was not
novel:  throughout  nearly  the  whole  of  the  19th century,  indebtedness  had  been  the
characteristic of public finances. The worrying aspect of the situation was that, due to the
war, external credit was practically blocked and there was no other alternative but to
negotiate domestic credit, when, as had happened in other critical times in the history of
the country, the potential lenders were reluctant to meet the needs of the government. 
48 The efforts of the Treasury Minister, Pedro Blanco (1917-1918), to obtain credits from the
bankers had meager results. The head of one of the country´s biggest banks (the Banco de
Colombia) suggested that one solution to the monetary crisis would be to revoke the
norm which prohibited mortgage banks from issuing mortgage bonds at a value of less
than one hundred pesos, originally intended to prevent such certificates of value from
being used as a currency or paper money.
49 After  the  meeting between Minister  Blanco and the bankers,  the  government  issued
decree 319 of 1918 which allowed the banks to emit mortgage bonds of any value again.
The banks responded to this measure by granting the government a short-term loan of
$580,000 pesos, partly in currency and partly in mortgage bonds which the government
put into circulation as currency, at an 12 % interest rate and backed by the revenues from
the salt exploitations it ran (Blanco 1918). With a deficit of nearly 5 million pesos, the
credit was soon exhausted, especially by the payment of debt. 
50 As an alternative means of finance, the Congress authorized an emission of bearer bonds
(Law 23 of 1918), with an annual interest rate of 10 %, bills payable on demand, with a
three-month term and redeemable on a weekly basis through a lottery and backed by all
of the government´s revenues. The results were not favorable, because, in the opinion of
Minister Jaramillo, the resources were not only inadequate but they were also used by
people to pay urgent cash debts, so they sold the bonds at a high discount. In addition,
the  format  of  the  notes  did  not  inspire  enough  confidence,  there  was  not  enough
currency for people to acquire them and money exchangers charged a high commission
(Jaramillo 1988a, p. 64-65).
51 In 1919, the new Minister managed to obtain loans of $1,694, 500 pesos, that is, thrice
what Minister Blanco had secured from the bankers, but the loans took the form of bills
of exchange and drafts on foreign banks, which the government could not introduce to
the domestic market because that would cause a strong devaluation. Using a creative
device, the government exchanged those notes for English bank notes in foreign markets
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and used the Sterling to pay for its domestic purchases until the Supreme Court ruled
that the measure was unconstitutional. That led to a threat of a further crisis, which was
solved with its promise to redeem the bank notes in the hands of the public at a rate at
par with the national currency (Jaramillo 1988b). 
52 Two other factors aggravated the situation. On the one hand, the traditional deficit in the
balance of trade with the United States gave way to a position of surplus which could not
be taken advantage of because in that period the United States did not allow the export of
metallic  currency.  On  the  other,  the  export  of  gold,  both  in  coins  and  ingots,  was
permitted and once again, the financial position of the government did not provide it
with the resources to prohibit it and acquire the gold. 
53 The effects of the financial crisis were enormous and a collateral effect was that the
policy to control  the lepers was threatened,  as  was stopping the spread of  Hansen´s
disease in the end. There were further collateral effects, noted by Minister Jaramillo: 
Thus, in the month of December [1918], a very grave situation arose, since evident
symptoms of  decomposition and disaster were noted in several  branches of  the
public administration: the exodus of the diseased persons from the refuge of the
leper  colonies  because  their  rations  had  not  been  paid;  visible  symptoms  of
discontent in some units of the army; attempts to refuse to do their work on the
part  of  some  units  of  the  police;  strikes  by  the  employees  of  the  judiciary  in
different  places  and  everywhere,  vehement  and  prolonged  complaints  and
expressions  of  protest  about  that  situation,  which  had  become  unsustainable
(Jaramillo 1998a, p. 67). 
54 That situation was not unknown in the country: a good number of the deficits in the 19th
century and early 20th century had resulted in the postponement of the payment of the
salaries  of  public  officials  and  a  failure  to  comply  with  the  commitments  of  social
protection. 
55 This difficult  financial  situation had a strong impact on the leper colonies,  since the
mortuary tax had provided very few revenues and as a result, the shortfall had to be
financed from the national budget. At the same time that the isolation of the diseased was
legally authorized, a source of finance was established for the maintenance of the sites of
reclusion: the leper colonies tax. In the process of centralizing the management of the
leper colonies (1907), this tax, collected in every department of the country, was intended
to be the main source of financing the government needed to attend to the needs of the
functioning  of  those  colonies,  which  included  the  development  of  the  physical
infrastructure, the administration of their operations, medical care and support for the
living expenses of the diseased. 
56 For the financial year of 1918 the tax on mortuaries had yielded $150, 992.50 pesos and
total expenses rose to $571, 553.49 pesos, that is, the tax barely covered 28 % of total
expenses. The shortage of resources is a common theme in the different reports of the
Board: year after year, it repeated that it was impossible to fulfill the plans for improving
the infrastructure,  supplies  and medical  equipment  in the colonies,  due to  a  lack of
sufficient resources. From the figures shown in the previous table, it is clear that the
monetary ration given to each patient amounted to an average of $0.22 pesos, well below
the amount stipulated in the legislation of that period ($0.30 pesos). 
57 A report by the Central Hygiene Board in 1916 detailed the expenses of the leper colonies
for the period between June 1, 1915 and July 1, 1916.
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Patients 2,458 2,069 149
Male patients 1,226 1,092  
Female patients 1,232 977  
    
Rations of the patients 203,762.07 172,215.91 17,510.90
    
Salaries of all the employees 37,157.00 27,213.05 12,167.25
Buildings and maintenance 16,387.20 7,844.5 8,192.42
Leasing  of  locales  for  the  patients  in  the  leper
colonies
13,036.00 2,137.00 209.50
Maintenance of the healthy children of the lepers 14,700.79 5,618.07 0.00
Domestic services in the hospitals and asylums 12,356.50 9,120.00 4,811.00
Drugs,  medical  supplies,  disinfection  and
laboratories
3,813.33 2,220.00 1,080.00
Total $ 301,212.89 $ 226,368.53 $ 43,971.07
Discounting the ration, each patient has cost $8.79 $8.51 $22.55
Source: On the base of Junta Central de Higiene (1916)
58 Given  the  financial  conditions  at  the  time,  the  General  Treasury  transferred  the
remittances to the treasuries of the leper colonies in different kinds of currency; that is, it
depended on the currency which was available to it at the time. It included gold-backed
bank notes (made by the American Bank Note Company), bank notes from the defunct
Banco Nacional, resealed bank notes (from the time of the War of a Thousand Days), the
national  currency  and  the  special  coins  for  the  leper  colonies.  In  addition,  the
transferences of the government were sporadic, one of the factors responsible for the
financial  crisis  in the colonies.  It  was not until  1928,  under the last president of  the
Conservative Republic, Miguel Abadía Méndez (1926-1930) that the government decided
that the remittances to the leper colonies should exclusively be in metallic  currency
(decree 831 of 1928).
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3. The monetary ration: central component of the
institutional design
59 The special  currency  has  to  be  jointly  analyzed  with  the  ration  as  two components
employed to carry out the policy for the leper colonies, which sought to ensure that the
diseased remained in those places of reclusion. 
60 For the maintenance of those interned in the leper colonies, a “ration” was established16,
in the form of a daily monetary payment for each one. And it was understood to be a
mechanism to  ensure  that  the  leper  would stay  in  the  place  of  confinement  on the
supposition that  he or she would be supplied with the means needed for his  or  her
physical  maintenance there.  A difference was established between the amount of the
ration for the lepers who were hospitalized and the amount for those who were not. The
latter received more,  on the grounds that the hospitalized lepers were already being
subsidized, to a degree, by the sanatorium in which they were being treated. 
61 The  policy  for  the  obligatory  confinement  of  the  diseased  persons  caused  a  major
pressure on governmental finances which could not be eased by the mortuary tax or the
transferences from the national budget. Although there were many provisions adopted to
increase the yields  from and improve the administration of  the tax,  the shortage of
resources was seen in delays in the infrastructure work, failures to pay the officials on
time and reductions of the ration. The cuts in the last item began pretty quickly. In 1910
(under Decree 300 of that year), it was decreed that the isolated patients who enjoyed an
income or revenue which allowed them to support themselves and the patients who were
employees of the colonies and had monthly income of more than 30 pesos would only be
entitled to a daily ration of 10 centavos (3 pesos a month); that is, half of what the other
lepers received.  For their part,  the interns in the hospital  of  the leper colony would
receive: 0.15 percent of a peso in food, laundry expenses, clothing, etc., and $0.05 pesos in
money. 
62 According to the legal norms, the ration was to be given to the patients on a weekly basis,
that is, on one day they would receive enough to cover their expenses for a week. Once it
was handed over, the ration was used buy food in the local marketplace, since nothing
was grown in the colonies and anything in the way of manufactures or commerce was
very limited and restricted to relatives of the patients or people who lived in the same
community but in a separate section17. 
63 The patients paid the traders they bought from with the special  currency and those
traders had to remit the coins to a treasurer who suffered from the disease, who, in turn,
gave them a promissory note which was meant to be redeemed by the official treasurer of
the colony, who was free of the disease, and when the money was available, paid the
traders with national coins or banknotes. When it was not, he gave them a postal order
which they could redeem in banks, with the payments backed by the General Treasury of
the Republic. 
64 The patients who had to engage in transactions with those who lived outside of the leper
colonies had to follow a similar procedure: they were required to solicit a postal order
– the only manner in which they could undertake such transactions – and hope that there
was enough money in the treasury of the colony. The money in the treasury came from
government transferences and there was an order that the priority for the exchange of
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currency should be: first, the food suppliers and then the inmates, in accordance with
their place on the line and the availability of the money. 
65 In a setup of that nature, it was not surprising, as different reports in that period noted,
that  the  interns  became  victims  of  usurers.  The  report  which  the  Central  Board  of
Hygiene submitted to the Congress in 1916 estimated that due to rises in the price of
foods, the ration had lost 30 % of its value. In addition, the difficulty of exchanging the
special currency for money or postal orders for external transactions was exploited by
money-lenders. 
66 The obligatory use of a special coinage of little value issued in insufficient amounts, like
the granting of a meager ration and the delays in receiving it, meant that the population
of lepers and others in the leper colonies assumed the costs when the nominal value of
the funds assigned to them were reduced by cuts in the daily ration and coins of little
value.  The  combination  of  these  two  factors  fed  into  an  economy  of  credit  which
increased the cost of living for those in the leper colonies. 
67 The special currency which circulated in the leper colonies should be regarded as an
extension of the way in which the State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, instituted a
special monetary regime for the places where the lepers were confined due to a disease
which, given the limited medical knowledge at that time, was considered as potentially
dangerous for society.  The argument that the disease was only transmitted by paper
money, not coins, was an effective defense of a fractional currency. 
68 However,  the main purpose of  that currency in the leper colonies was to secure the
confinement of the diseased as a way to prevent them from infecting the rest of society.
Thus, the community of payments which was established with that unit of account had to
fulfill the function of stopping the diseased from going beyond the geographical limits of
the colony, that is, it exercised a social control over those with Hansen´s disease. 
69 That  situation  means  that  we  have  to  regard  the  special  currency  as  more  than  a
monetary instrument and think of it as part of both the monetary regime and the system
of social protection. If only its instrument nature is taken into account, it can be thought
of as a parallel currency (Blanc 1988), like many others which existed in the country, that
is, it was not its distinguishing feature. As was mentioned above, during the War of a
Thousand Days, the government resorted to any monetary species it could lay its hands
on, including private coins issued by businessmen for the convenience of their consumers
(or commercial intermediaries). Another important example of parallel currencies were
the hacienda coins, which had different shapes, values and units. Some were made of
wood of leather and their unit of measurement might be a day of work or a ration of food,
others could be a vile metal and have as the unit the same as the national currency.
70 Like  the  special  currency  for  the  lepers´  colonies  in  its  condition  of  a  monetary
instrument, these parallel currencies could serve such functions as payment, credit and
value deposits,  even though the area of their circulation was limited. The differences
between them had to do with the political, socio-economic and monetary system in which
they were inscribed. The contrast between the special currency of the lepers´ colonies
and the tokens illustrate the point. The latter were used by the owners of haciendas to
pay for the work of their peons and they were redeemed through the purchase of goods
sold in the stores on the estate run by the landowner and later, circulated again when the
workers were paid, so that their commercial value was wholly governed by the emitter,
since he alone controlled the two ends of the procedure. 
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71 By contrast, it was the State which issued the special lepers´ currency, which was defined
in accordance with the national currency unit so that the referent of sovereignty was the
State and its  value was affected by the factors which affected the national  currency.
Furthermore,  the  amount  of  money  in  circulation  depended  on  the  size  of  the
transferences from the State, especially for the payment of lepers who were government
employees and the monetary ration.
72 As indicated above in the case of the ration, the cycle is: a) weekly payment of the ration
in special currency to the lepers, b) transfer of the special currency to the merchants who
come from outside the leper colony through the purchase of merchandise, c) exchange of
the special currency that the merchants received from the leper-buyers for a voucher in
the internal treasury of the leper colony and, d) finally,  exchange of the voucher for
national currency in the external treasury of the leper colony.
73 This cycle meant that if previously the external treasury had not made the appropriation
for the conversion of the vouchers into the hands of merchants by national currency, the
monetary  circuit  was  broken.  When  the  external  treasury  does  not  have  national
currency  to  make  the  change  of  the  vouchers,  it  did  not  pay  the  monetary  ration,
consequently the circuit cannot be started. In contrast whit the hacienda coins the special
currency was not able to function unless there was previous deposit of resources in the
national currency that would pay for the merchandise.
74 That situation was not only owed to the financial straits of the national government, but
also to the fact that, from the standpoint of the State, the ration was not a payment for a
job  of  work  or  the  provision  of  a  service,  but  a  subsidy,  that  is,  the  State  did  not
acknowledge that it a was social debt owed to the lepers. By the same token, the cycle of
payments and purchases was not confined to the area of the leper colony but depended
on economic activities which took place outside of the colony. 
75 Under this condition an interruption in the payment of the ration induces to limit the
consumption and / or to increase the credit. The monetary circuit created by the ration
does not translate into the total absence of special currency in circulation. On the one
hand, not all special currency is used for purchases from merchants outside the leper
colony, but also for internal purchases; on the other, the payment of the lepers who work
as government employees also generates a special currency flow.
76 The effects of the currency will depend on the condition of income and health of the
leper, those who do not have means of living will be more exposed to the abuse of credit,
than those who develop some economic activity. All this was the consequence of a system
of social protection based on the confinement of the lepers, since they did not have the
resources needed to produce the goods and services which their subsistence depended
on. 
77 Finally, it should be added that in the stricto sensu the special currency did not translate
into a good hygiene practice, since the merchants outside the leper colony came into
direct  contact  with  the  patients  and  with  the  “coscoja”,  and  this  did  not  mean  a
significant increase in contagion.
 
Conclusions
78 This analysis of the currency in the leper colonies questions the standard approaches to
the study of currencies. The categories found in such research programs cannot provide
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answers to the question of the role played by currency in a society of the excluded. We
can barely begin to analyze that question on the basis of a number of economic concepts
(unit of account, means of exchange and store of value) which are limited and whose
application is neutral in the case of social groups and with regard to the economy18. 
79 An alternative tool of analysis related to this “exceptional normal” occurrence is one
based on a program of investigation which acknowledges that the currency rests of three
foundations: debt, trust and sovereignty, which is more of a social relationship than an
economic instrument, forms an integral part of the political system and is guaranteed not
by the mercantile system but the law. In this sense, it would behave like a social contract,
that is, the legitimacy of the currency is purely political, since it perennially links the
individual with society as a whole (Aglietta 2016). 
80 Thus, the choice of a monetary regime is a political option, since the currency is not the
result  of  the mercantile economy,  but,  on the contrary,  the currency establishes the
mercantile economy. The result of an approach of this kind is to do away with “the neo-
classical fable which holds that the increase in transaction costs associated with barter
might have led the economic agents,  on their own, to invent currency” (Boyer 2015,
p. 34). 
81 The  coscoja  functioned  within  a  monetary  area  whose  limits  were  defined  by  the
perimeters of the leper colony, imposed on its inhabitants, who, to use the term of Castel
(1997), were placed in a condition of social disaffiliation. This enclosure not only sought
to prevent the disease from spreading but also to limit the possibility that those with
Hansen´s disease might leave the “city/prison” whose borders were defined by a barbed
wire fence and guarded by squads of policemen. 
82 We should recall that the obligation to accept a currency imposed by the government is
not an exceptional case in the monetary history of the current nation of Colombia. The
antecedents go back to the Spanish empire,  which implanted its currency during the
colonization of America. Another example was the imposition of a legal tender during the
period of the Regeneration, which had been preceded by the acceptance of the paper
money of the Banco Nacional in the offices of the Ministry of Finance as a form of the
payment  of  taxes.  The  same  would  apply  to  the  different  monetary  resources  the
government resorted to during the War of a Thousand Days. 
83 In  the  case  of  the  coscoja,  the  imposition  of  a  currency  was  an  exercise  of  political
sovereignty, based on the idea that it was a way for the State to protect another sector of
the population and thus guarantee its survival. At the start of the enclosure of the leper
colonies,  the  constitutional  order  which  the  State  legitimized  was  regarded  as  a
repressive measure in the sense that it was illegitimate for those who were confined,
which, in turn, called into question the sovereignty of the political power, a doubt which
grew when the patients who were the victims of it were stripped of their political rights,
and lost their status as citizens for a long time. 
84 This loss of citizenship, as well  as the way it placed the victims on the margins of a
salaried economy, meant that they were not compensated for the payment of the social
debt which applies in salaried societies and in the context of Welfare States – but that
their social protection resided in a charitable –repressive policy managed by the State,
private entities and the Church. One of the main ways to secure its application was the
“monetary ration”, a sort of subsidy on demand, on the condition that they remained in
the ghetto. 
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85 The amount of the ration did not allow them to accumulate wealth: instead, the subsidy
barely allowed them to survive. The liquidity which some of the diseased had was related
to the possibility of finding a job in the administration of the leper colony, the assets they
had  acquired  before  they  were  confined  there  and  the  remittances  in  the  national
currency sent by the relatives of wealthy patients whenever their family did not abandon
the leper. 
86 The obligatory use of a special currency which could only circulate within the confines of
those establishments meant that trust in that monetary asset lay in the possibility of
exchanging it for the different national currencies then in use in the country, a situation
that was similar to exchanging a national currency in a foreign country, but made more
difficult by the stigma attached to the leper. 
87 From 1923 onwards, the special currency for the leper colonies coexisted with the one
emitted by the Banco de la República, which functioned as a central bank and imposed
the peso as the national currency. That self-referential  currency,  which established a
hierarchical trust in it, could not be exported to the leper colonies. In short, during the
period under study monetary management responded to decisions of a political nature in
the  framework  of  the  development  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State.  In  addition,  the
political regime and the medical knowledge at that time shaped the way in which the
“fight  against  leprosy”  was  carried  out,  which  formed  part  of  the  Social  Protection
System,  the  result  of  “a  particular  arrangement  between the  political  system,  social
actors and economic model” (Bizberg 2015, p. 500). 
88 The link with the political side was also found in the social protection system. As the
program for the investigation of heterodoxy (Théret 2006 and Rodríguez S. 2011b) has
shown, the social protection system is a mediation between the domestic, economic and
political  order,  which is  shaped by political  decisions and thus depends both on the
political regime and the type of State. During the period in question the political order
was immersed in a pre-capitalist society which had still not shaped a National State and
evidenced a strong political instability on the internal level. From this standpoint, it is
important  to  understand the  particular  system of  social  protection which the  social
organization would have. 
89 When, by virtue of strengthening the salaried system, trades unions play a decisive role
in the formulation of  a  system of  social  protection (based on its  strengthening),  the
system is not the same as when that group has a limited power in the society and the
programs of protection are established on the basis of a charitable approach aimed at
sectors of the population with a low level of organization and thus little influence on
policies. 
90 In the latter case, such social groups wind up being regarded as passive actors who have
to be the subject of policies which shape them to the objectives of the reformers. This
charitable policy involves a strong degree of control over the population and, to top it, is
at the service of the clientelist practices undertaken by different governments. 
91 In the case under study, the influence of the political regime on the fight against leprosy
is  confirmed in the light  of  the contrast  between the measures adopted by different
political regimes. During the period of the Radical Olympus (the first Liberal Republic),
while it did include the founding of three leper colonies, the treatment of the diseased did
not stipulate their obligatory confinement. In the Conservative Republic, particularly in
the period between the Regeneration and the dictatorship of general Reyes, the policies
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became  more  repressive.  Finally,  with  the  development  of  the  process  of
industrialization,  urbanization  and a  salaried  economy,  accompanied  by  a  political
regime that was a little more democratic,  known as the second Liberal  Republic,  the
policies of confinement became more flexible.
92 The way in which the political regime acted towards the diseased was also articulated to
changes in the administrative field. Insofar as the design of the policy was charitable/
repressive, the Ministry of Government was the agency responsible for implementing it.
Insofar as it was a policy for the prevention of the disease, it was the Ministry of Public
Education. Insofar as leprosy was regarded as a disease which incapacitated those who
suffered from it, the responsible agency was the Ministry of Labor and Social Care19. Of
course,  such  changes  also  interacted  with  the  dynamics  of  both  the  Colombian  and
international scientific community. 
93 The lack of knowledge about the way in which the disease spread led to the design of
“inhuman”  policies  against  those  who  suffered  from  it.  The  1897  Berlin  Congress
legitimized the policy of isolation. For its part, the 6th Pan-American Conference (1928)
which established the Pan-American Sanitary Code changed that policy in the sense that
leprosy was no longer regarded as a sanitary problem but a question of public health. 
94 While they did not respond to the dynamics of the dependent countries themselves, these
changes corresponded to transformations in the accumulative and political regimes of
the countries of the center. Among the trends which modified the social order there was
the development of the salaried relationship, which imposed the payment of social debts
as one of its criteria: that of social progress. The problem of responsibility is associated
with this idea, as Bourdieu rightly notes: 
The discovery of  the microbe favors the collectivization of  the risk.  If microbes
exist,  then individuals  are not responsible for their  own diseases.  In the period
when the microbe was discovered, it was an argument for the socialization of the
risks and the removal of individual responsibilities within the social sphere – it is
possible to find an analogy with the genetics of today. (Bourdieu 2012, p. 574).
95 Social progress not only gave a priority to the payment of the social debt in the face of
private ones, but it recognized that a fundamental condition of attaining a better quality
of life was to have a healthy population but with due respect for their human rights,
which did not happen with the social disaffiliation of those who suffered from the bacillus
of Hansen.
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NOTES
1. We refer here to one of the characteristics of Carlo Ginzburg´s concept of micro-history (1994),
where, as Serna and Pons (2002) point out, it is possible to approach “a subject of investigation
which, for its strangeness, may reveal the negative or fragments of normal historical events or
collective historical processes that are normal”.
2. According to Gardeta (1999) the fear of contagion was found from the time of the Spanish
colony. In the different legal regulations during the time span covered by this article, we often
find references to  demands,  by  the citizenry,  that  those  with leprosy  should  not  allowed to
wander through the country´s cities.
3. In the 1821 Constitution, to qualify as a citizen, one had to be a Colombian, an adult, literate,
and with an assured income and not a livelihood which depended on another person, like that of
a domestic servant or day-laborer. 
4. For this sociologist, one of the central aspects, from the point of view of the construction of
the  State  in  the  19th century,  was  the  “question  of  the  responsibility  for  faults:  who  was
responsible? It was not by accident that the French philosophers and sociologists of the late 19th
century were concerned with the notion of responsibility: is responsibility a public or private
matter?  Does  responsibility  fall  on  individuals  or  it  is  up  to  public  bodies  to  assume
responsibilities? Finally, the public authorities became the ones who were responsible for the
true causes, which were hidden under the apparent responsibilities of persons”. (Bourdieu 2012,
p. 572).
5. The period between 1886 and 1930 has been called the Conservative Republic,  due to the
political hegemony of that party. One of the characteristics of the period in the field of power
was the alliance between big landowners, groups of exporters of agricultural products and the
financial aristocracy. 
6. According to González (2006, p. 74), in this period: “The idea that sovereignty resided
in  the  Nation  was  restored,  which  was  thought  of  as  an  organic,  homogenous  and
corporative  unit,  set  above  particularisms  and  regionalisms”.  This  alliance  against
radicalism was “to a very large extent the triumph of pro-Catholic forms of sociability,
which the conservative elites in Bogotá were accustomed to share” (Loaiza 2011, p. 19).
The Regeneration has been called a regime with a strong theocratic component, which
sought to ensure public order and each individual´s respect for his position in the social
scale.
7. In his 1901 study of the geography of the disease, the French expert on leprosy, Don
Sauton, stated that “Colombia is the region in the world most devastated by leprosy” and
the Turkish doctor Démetrius Zambaco Pacha claimed in 1914 that 3 % of the Colombian
population suffered from leprosy.  A  kind of  leprosy phobia  seized the  upper  classes
(Obregón 2002, p. 13). “In 1909 in Bogotá, Pablo García Medina, acting as Secretary of the
Hygiene Board, published a Report on the Leper Colonies, where the official statistics
compiled since 1905 were first published: there were 4,296 lepers, of which 3,031 were
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confined in the three leper colonies, that is, 72 %” (Martínez 2006, p. 158). At the sixth
Pan-American  Congress,  held  in  Montevideo  in  December,  1920,  the  Colombian
representative, the same Pablo García Medina, tried to correct “the mistake about the
exaggerated number of lepers in Colombia which still exists”, putting the true figure at
6,500 (Coni 1921, p. 15).
8. The shares in that kind of bank were in the form of a diploma/share certificate: “on one side
was a portrait of Father Unía or Dr. Medina, in the center, in big letters, it read “Bank of the Lepers;
on the left:  “Capital:  the millions of the Divine Providence;  on the right: “Interest:  one percent;
below that: “The Bank is placed under the guidance of the Divine Providence; it was founded in the first
year of  the 20th century.  Aim:  to  provide a home,  clothing and food  for  the lepers  of  Colombia.  It  has
branches in all the cities of the Republic”. (Ortega 1938, p. 288). The confidence in this kind of bank
rested  on  its  invocation  of  the  Divine  Providence,  which  had  a  strong  impact  in  a  Catholic
country which trusted the Church more than the sovereignty of the political power. 
9. In 1903, the Boyacá Bank of the Leper Colonies was consolidated, on the basis of an association
of  priests,  political  leaders,  businessmen and public  employees.  Its  aim was to provide loans
against a personal guarantee or mortgage, remittances and the sale of real estate, and bills of
exchange (Acuña 2014).
10. Elena Peroni´s novel El puente de los suspiros (The bridge of sighs, 2013) describes how the
visitors to the leper colony had to be disinfected when they left that “city/jail”.  The Central
Hygiene Board created by the Regeneration were abolished by the administrative reforms of the
State  in  1913,  but  it  was  reestablished  under  Law  84  of  1914.  The  Board  was  granted
independence in the management of the leprosauria, a responsibility formerly granted to the
Ministry of Government.
11. The  Central  Hygiene  Board  created  by  the  Regeneration  had  been  abolished  by  the
administrative reforms of the State in 1913, but it was reestablished under Law 84 of 1914. The
Board  was  granted  independence  in  the  management  of  the  leprosauria,  a  responsibility
formerly granted to the Ministry of Government.
12. Despite the different reforms, structural changes in monetary exchange only came about
after 1923, with the creation of the Banco de la República, which was to serve as a central bank.
13. Since 1913, practically all of the legislative sessions had presented more than one bill for that
purpose.
14. In 1915,  to counteract the fall  in public  revenues,  a  tax on consumption was established
(which accounted for the equivalent of 20 % of the fiscal deficit), taxes on stamps and sheets of
paper with the State seal were increased and the funds which the Conversion Board had (meant
for  the  exchange  of  paper  money)  were  deposited  in  the  “common  funds”  of  the  General
Treasury. 
15. Since 1913, practically all of the legislative sessions had presented more than one bill for that
purpose.  In  the  1917 sessions  of  the  Congress  three  bills  were  presented:  two for  a  bank of
emission, proposed by the Treasury Ministry and another by the Council of State. The resolution
of this subject had to wait until 1923, when the Banco de la República was founded as a central
bank.
16. In general, the ration was a term that allowed expressing a daily food allowance, for example
in the case of hacienda workers, prisoners in prisons or hospitalized patients. These rations could
either be delivered in goods and services or in a monetary equivalent.
17. Compliance with the norms of confinement varied in different places and at different times.
In the early decades of the 20th century enforcement of the norms was especially strict in the
Leper Colony of Contratación, which had to do with the fact that its geographical isolation made
it very difficult to supply the colony with goods and obtain incomes beyond the ration. In Agua
de Dios, which was more accessible and closer to dynamic markets, there were more healthy
persons living in the colony.
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18. “The neutrality of currency is a sine qua non condition of the existence of pure economics. By
nature,  it  is  always  in  equilibrium”  (Aglietta  2016,  p. 40).  The  controversy  about  normative
economics  always  extends  to  the  supposed  neutrality  of  currency  and  its  detachment  from
political aspects. In that regard, the current trend of “regarding” currency as a variable which is
“exogenous” to political  aspects  does not  have much meaning.  Insofar as  it  is  supplied with
information about the state of the economy deriving from the payments it makes and thus has
information which the other agents in the economy lack, the work of the central bank invalidates
the  hypothesis  of  neutrality;  since  on  the  basis  of  this  information  the  central  bank  may
implement  monetary  policies  at  its  discretion  which  affect  given  sectors  of  the  economy,
whether it favors or negatively affects them (Aglietta 2016).
19. The political centralization sponsored by the Regeneration led to the establishment of
the Central Hygiene Board, and Law 104 of 1890 which authorized obligatory isolation,
which was reaffirmed by legislative decree 14 of 1905 and Decree 1024 of 1905. The Board
was a dependency of the Ministry of Government. In 1918, in addition to changing its
name to the National Directorate of Hygiene, this board became a dependency of the
Ministry of  Public Education.  In 1931,  the Directorate became known as the National
Department  of  Hygiene  and  Public  Care  and  was  transferred  to  the  Ministry  of
Government, and later, in 1938, to the Ministry of Labor and Social Care.
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This article is an account of the experience of the policy for the fight against leprosy developed
in Colombia between 1890 and 1930, which combined the obligatory confinement of the diseased
with  the  existence  of  a  special  currency  for  leper  colonies.  The  purpose  of  analyzing  that
experience is to probe the links between that currency and social protection, as well as to discuss
the theoretical elements which allow us to analyze that link in societies which have not attained
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